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COMMENT
INCREASING THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES
THROUGH ITS JOINT VENTURE LAWS: A LESSON TO
BE LEARNED FROM SOUTH KOREA
Tania Isenstein*
INTRODUCTION
The internationalization of markets has caused a crisis situation in
United States antitrust law. United States businesses suffer from in-
tense foreign competition and blame restrictive United States antitrust
laws. The United States business community is lagging behind world
competitors in technological sectors where joint research and develop-
ment ventures are often crucial to remaining competitive. Despite the
importance of research and development, however, many United States
businesses refrain from entering joint research and development ven-
tures because such action subjects the participants to the uncertainty of
antitrust scrutiny. Consequently, Congress enacted the National Coop-
erative Research Act' in 1984 which governs United States research
and development joint ventures. In marked contrast to the United
States stands South Korea's international success and their antitrust
statute governing joint ventures, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair
Trade Act.'
Part I of this comment discusses joint ventures generally and why
they are subject to antitrust scrutiny. Part II considers United States
joint venture law, including a detailed analysis of the National Cooper-
* J.D., 1991, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (1988).
2. Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree 12120, Apr. I. 1987 [hereinafter MRFTA].
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ative Research Act. Part III explores South Korea's Monopoly Regula-
tion and Fair Trade Act. Part IV of this comment examines the con-
nection between joint ventures and international competitiveness, both
in the abstract and with specific reference to the United States and
South Korea. Part V recommends that United States lawmakers con-
sider South Korea's experience with the regulation of joint ventures
when they consider future antitrust legislation for this country.
I. JOINT VENTURES GENERALLY
A. BACKGROUND
In order to understand how joint ventures affect competition, one
must understand how the theoretically "pure" forms of monopoly and
cartels influence competition. Many economists and lawmakers con-
sider monopolies harmful because they create inefficiency both by re-
stricting output and raising prices, as well as by creating allocative
inefficiency. 3 Output is the generally accepted gauge for determining
3. See Landes, Harm to Competition: Cartels, Mergers & Joint Ventures, 52 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 625, 625-26 (1983)(observing that cartels are objectionable because they
reduce output while raising price); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 98-101 (1978)(detailing the inefficiencies of monopolies).
Although there is a general consensus that monopolies are undesirable because of
their inefficiency, there is controversy concerning whether the law should consider in-
come distribution, or what is known as the wealth transfer, associated with monopoly.
Id. Bork warns that the courts should not consider income distribution effects of an
activity in determining antitrust legality. Id. at 110-13. But see Lande, Wealth Trans-
fers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 68 (1982) (admitting that the
majority view is that the
antitrust laws should en- price
hance efficiency, yet argu-
ing that the antitrust laws
are for distributive
purposes).
To illustrate the effects of " mon.
monopoly, examine the
graph at right. This graph
is a standard consumer wel- p--,
fare model characterization
of monopoly found in any demand
microeconomic textbook.
E.g., R. BORK, supra, at
107. It is important to note
that a profit maximizing
monopolist will restrict out-
put and charge higher
prices than the perfect com- ,
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anticompetitive behavior.' If, for example, a firm restricts output, there
is reason to suspect anticompetitive behavior. Conversely, in situations
where a firm increases output there is generally a presumption of
procompetitiveness. 5 Not all behavior restricting competition is necessa-
rily evil to an economy, however, if there are also procompetitive ef-
fects. Joint ventures fall into this category. They may reduce output,
but they also have a positive effect on the economy.
B. JOINT VENTURE DEFINED
Joint venture analysis begins with defining the term.' Defining a joint
venture is difficult however.8 Joint ventures can be classified as falling
this is what economists call the dead-weight loss (the triangle above). Id. at 108. The
triangle represents two items: (1) the output that would have been purchased if perfect
competition prevailed, and (2) resources whose most efficient use would have been ap-
plied to that forgone output which are being used less efficiently. Id. This is known as
allocative inefficiency. Id. These negative effects of monopoly are not in dispute. See id.
at 101 (asserting that the evils of monopoly are not high prices or reduced production
but misallocated resources); Lande, supra, at 72-79 (exploring allocative inefficiency as
one result of monopoly).
Another more controversial effect of monopoly is the wealth transfer. This is the shift
of consumer surplus in perfect competition to producer surplus in monopoly (arrow in
graph). R. BORK, supra, at 85-86. In simple terms, the monopolist gets richer while the
consumer grows poorer. Id. Chicagoan economists, often considered conservatives, hold
that this is not and should not be an antitrust concern because it involves a value judg-
ment regarding who should receive the surplus. Id. Further, this argument ignores the
fact that producers are consumers too. Id. Liberal thought, however, holds that this
transfer of wealth is troubling and cites the legislative history of the antitrust laws in
support of this contention. See Lande, supra, at 93-96, 112-14, 135-36 (discussing leg-
islative intent with respect to the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act,
the Clayton Act, and the redistribution of wealth); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust.-
Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191,
1192-96 (1977)(postulating that legislative intent indicates goals such as equity and
income distribution for antitrust law); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic
Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076-79 (1979)(considering the legisla-
ture's intent that antitrust laws serve non-economic goals).
4. Landes, supra note 3, at 627. Output is a key measurement for anticompetitive
behavior because it determines the deadweight loss. Id.
5. id.
6. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (191 1)(explaining that if
all contracts restraining trade were unlawful every contract would be illegal); United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567 (1989)(observing that virtually every
business contract restrains trade to a degree); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271, 272 (6th Cir. 1898), affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)(permitting a contract
to restrain trade if the restraint is ancillary); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897)(stating that only contracts unreasonably restraining
trade violate antitrust laws).
7. Kitch, The Antitrust Economics of Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 957, 960
(1985).
8. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 360 (3d ed. 1983). A joint venture is -[a]n
expansive notion without definite meaning or antitrust consequence." Id.; see Wright,
The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New Antitrust Regime for Joint
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somewhere between mergers and naked cartels.' Joint ventures are sim-
ilar to mergers in that they involve cooperation between firms that are
often competitors.10 Joint ventures differ from mergers, however, be-
cause joint ventures are less integrated, venturers retain their individual
identities, and all parties' operations unrelated to the venture remain
separate."1
Joint ventures are similar to naked cartels in that they both involve
an agreement between competitors that, directly or indirectly, affects
prices. Joint ventures differ from cartels, however, which do not inte-
grate resources or enhance productive capacity.1 2 Hence, joint ventures
may reduce competition less than a merger would and could increase
efficiency more than a naked cartel to fix prices.1 3
Research & Development Ventures, 1 HIGH TECH L.J. 133, 144 (1986)(recognizing
that a joint venture could be almost any agreement between two firms); Pitofsky, A
Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 893-94
(1985)(noting that defining a joint venture is problematic for antitrust enforcement
because it could be any business enterprise where parties collaborate for a business
goal).
9. E.g., Kitch, supra note 7, at 960 (advancing the proposition that joint ventures
require less restraint on competition than mergers yet possess more hope of increased
efficiency than a naked price fix); Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 893 (declaring joint ven-
tures to fall between the two extremes of mergers and naked cartels).
10. E.g., Kitch, supra note 7, at 960. See Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d
971, 973-74 (8th Cir. 1981)(considering the legality of a joint venture between two
producers of outboard motors); Virginia Excelsior Mills v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538, 539
(4th Cir. 1958)(evaluating a joint venture between two producers of packaging materi-
als); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 950-58 (D.
Mass. 1950)(examining a joint venture consisting of nine producers of coated
abrasives).
11. Wright, supra note 8, at 144-45. Another difference between a joint venture
and a merger is that a joint venture may be of limited duration while a merger is not.
Landes, supra note 3, at 630.
12. Pitofsky, supra note 6, at 893. It is this difference in procompetitive benefits
which determines that, under United States law, joint ventures are not illegal per se.
Id. Cartels to fix prices, unlike joint ventures, are unjustifiable and are therefore illegal.
Id.; see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-24 (1940)
(declaring that any combination tampering with prices is engaged in an unlawful activ-
ity regardless of whether the price was reasonable); United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 121 (1911) (finding any agreement to fix prices such a threat
to the market that such agreements are deemed unlawful without further inquiry).
13. Kitch, supra note 7, at 960. Perhaps the most thorough characterization of
joint ventures has been achieved by Joseph Brodley:
[A] joint venture may be defined for antitrust purposes as an integration of
operations between two or more separate firms in which the following conditions
are present:
1) the enterprise is under the joint control of the parent firms, which are not
under related control;
2) each parent makes a substantial contribution to the joint enterprise;
3) the enterprise exists as a business entity separate from its parents; and
4) the joint venture creates significant new enterprise capability in terms of new
productive capacity, new technology, a new product, or entry into a new market.
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C. BENEFITS AND HARMS FROM JOINT VENTURES
Joint venture activity can yield several procompetitive benefits, the
most significant of which is the encouragement of research and devel-
opment (R&D) necessary for technological competitiveness. 4 Joint
ventures encourage desirable R&D in several ways. First, joint ven-
tures allow each participant to decrease its exposure to the risks of
long-term research, which is often speculative yet necessary for techno-
logical advancement.1" Because firms engaged in research and develop-
ment joint ventures can spread the inherent risks of R&D, firms are
more likely to undertake R&D projects, which results in increased in-
novative activity. 6 Additionally, many businesses engage in joint ven-
tures to benefit from economies of scale,1 7 to consolidate firms with
complementary assets, to use those assets most efficiently,18 and to min-
imize the "free rider" problem often concomitant with research.' 9 Joint
Brodley, Joint Ventures & Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1523, 1526 (1982).
14. Kuhn, Emerging International Antitrust Perspectives on R&D Joint Ventures,
16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1181, 1181-82 (1984)[hcreinafter Kuhn]. The business
community accepts the view that research and development joint ventures enhance
technological competitiveness. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Guide Con-
cerning Research Joint Ventures (1980), ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
992 at 1, 2 [hereinafter Antitrust Guide](stating that in modern economies innovation
is key to competitiveness).
15. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1182 n.3; see also Brodley, supra note 13, at 1528
(observing that joint ventures reduce the participating firms' risk of loss).
16. S. BERG, J. DUNCAN & P. FRIEDMAN, JOINT VENTURE STRATEGIES AND COR-
PORATE INNOVATION 77 (1982). Although the risk of failure of a project is the same
with or without the joint venture, a firm can reap the benefits of the results with less
investment and therefore with less total risk. Id. Although the participants will have to
share the rewards, this is usually less important than the reduced risk. Id.; see also id.
at 94-95 (providing a detailed discussion of joint ventures as they relate to risk reduc-
tion and risk aversion); Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 895 (noting the situation in which
potential competitors will not assume the entire risk of an undertaking but are willing
to enter into the market with partners); Wright, supra note 8, at 147 (characterizing
research as a high risk activity).
17. Weston & Ornstein, Efficiency Considerations in Joint Ventures, 53 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 85 (1984). Economies of scale become relevant when the project may be
carried out more efficiently if done on a larger scale. Kitch, supra note 7, at 963.
Economies of scale are also relevant to risk in that a project may be too large for one
firm only because it involves too much risk, not because of other factors of production.
Id.
18. Kitch, supra note 7, at 694. One incentive to create a joint venture exists when
two firms each possess a different component or asset needed for the production of a
good. Id. A joint venture is beneficial in this situation because it could yield a competi-
tor that would not otherwise exist. Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 895. Furthermore, there
may only be a limited number of persons sufficiently skilled to carry out advanced
technological research, so that a single company on its own may not be able to success-
fully operate such a project. S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3105.
19. Wright, supra note 8, at 147 n.79. A free rider is someone who reaps the bene-
fits of another's investment without contributing. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, AN-
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ventures also avoid the duplication of effort that often occurs when
competing firms conduct the same research.20 Finally, joint ventures
reduce transaction costs, thereby increasing efficiency.21
Joint ventures also yield more general benefits. For example, in-
creased technological rivalry between joint ventures stimulates innova-
tion by heightening competition.22 Joint ventures can also increase the
market value of the participating firms.23 In addition, international
joint ventures provide companies with access to foreign markets other-
wise inaccessible due to insufficient capital, technology, or personnel.
24
Anticompetitve effects may accompany the procompetitive benefits of
joint ventures. The most discussed and feared anticompetitive effect is
"spillover collusion. 2 5 Spillover collusion occurs when firms congregate
TITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 177 (2d ed. 1981). This
happens often with research because the research can be gotten by others through sim-
ple methods such as reverse engineering. Wright, supra note 8, at 147 n.79. See Kitch,
supra note 7, at 963 (explaining how the free rider problem is an imperfection in the
market and how this externality can be corrected through the use of joint ventures).
20. Wright, supra note 8, at 148. For example, transactional efficiency occurs when
firms with complementary assets form a joint venture utilizing those assets instead of
purchasing them from each other. Kitch, supra note 7 at 964.
21. Kitch, supra note 7, at 964. See Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 895 (proffering profit
sharing instead of fixed fees, and joint venture structure instead of contracts which
require anticipation and specification, as some of the joint venture's transactional effi-
ciencies). For a detailed study from a transactional approach, otherwise known as the
"organizational failures framework," see 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR-
CHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); see also Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (providing the seminal study which created the
transaction costs approach).
22. S. BERG, J. DUNCAN & D. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 127-36.
23. Weston & Ornstein, supra note 17, at 94. This results from the expectation
that the joint venture will positively affect the firm's efficiency. Id.
24. Wright, supra note 6, at 145-46. International joint ventures may also permit
entry into economies that do not permit enterprises where a majority of the firm is
owned by a foreign entity. Id. There are many reasons for the rise of international joint
ventures. Local participation, for example, may provide an otherwise foreign owned
venture with the best managerial talent. W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, JOINT INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (1971). Additionally, a
local government may effectively force the foreign investor to structure the investment
in the form of a joint venture by requiring local participation or making the awarding
of licenses contingent upon a joint venture arrangement. Id. For developing countries, a
joint venture may symbolize equality between themselves and foreign investors as well
as the hope of economic development. Id. Some developing countries engaging in inter-
national joint ventures include Iran, Liberia, Chile, Africa, Hong Kong, India, Turkey,
Indonesia, Ghana, and Brazil. See generally id. (discussing international joint ventures
in each of these countries); W. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS VENTURES (1961)(studying the significance of the international joint venture
in detail). South Korean policy is to encourage joint ventures between a United States
investor and a South Korean enterprise. Chan-Jin Kim, The Antimerger Laws of the
United States, Japan and Korea, 12 KOREAN J. OF COMP. L. 1, 36 (1984).
25. See Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 900 (observing that joint ventures may encourage
collusion by allowing competitor parents to fix prices or exchange information regard-
[VOL. 6:435
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for a legal, procompetitive purpose, yet the group engages in anticom-
petitive collusion, such as price fixing." Additionally, a joint venture
may impose anticompetitive collateral restraints not reasonably related
to the joint venture.2 Collateral restraints are agreements between the
parties which would be illegal if not necessary for the success of the
joint venture.2 8 Joint ventures may also restrict competition by prevent-
ing potential competitors from entering the market .2  Finally, the joint
venture may stifle competition by virtue of the standard agreement that
the parents not compete with the joint venture.30 Concern about the
ing future prices, capacity, or sales); Weston & Ornstein, supra note 17, at 85 (assert-
ing that in the past courts' primary concern have been spillover collusion); S. BERG. J.
DUNCAN & D. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 68 (declaring spillover collusion a major
concern with joint ventures); see also United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F.
Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), modified, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (examining
a joint venture that firms had used to organize a worldwide cartel); United States v.
Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp. 947, 947 (D. Mass. 1950) (condemning a joint venture
because it would give the participants who were otherwise competitors a chance to
exchange information not essential for the success of the joint venture).
26. See S. BERG, J. DUNCAN & D. FRIEDMAN , supra note 16, at 69 (asserting that
firms forming marketing joint ventures are most likely to form them for the purpose of
creating the opportunity to engage in anticompetitive behavior).
27. Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 901.
28. Id. An example of this is an agreement between the participants by which they
each put unique technology into the joint venture to prevent the other participants from
using that technology for their individual benefit. Without the joint venture, courts
could declare this agreement illegal per se but it is necessary if parties will be contrib-
uting technology to the joint venture. Id. For a discussion of illegal collateral restraints,
see Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981)(finding certain agree-
ments not reasonably related to the joint venture).
29. Weston & Ornstein, supra note 17, at 85. The court's concern is most acute
when parents of the joint venture already compete in the market or when they would
have entered the market, because in such cases the joint venture does not add a new
competitor to the market. Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 896. Instead, there is only one
competitor (the joint venture) where there would have been more (the parents). Id. at
897. There is the least antitrust concern where neither parent competed nor was likely
to enter the market, because such a joint venture would add a new competitor. Id. at
898. A joint venture case becomes more complex, however, where one parent is not a
potential competitor and one parent is. Id.
30. Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 899. If courts prohibited joint ventures on this basis.
then the number of joint ventures would decrease. As a result, United States courts
generally do not use the "stifling" effect test to disallow joint ventures. See United
States v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 33-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). rev'd
on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963)(finding a territorial restraint on the parents of
a joint venture not unreasonable and not a per se violation of antitrust laws); United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 159 (1964)(holding that an agreement
between parties to a joint venture not to enter a product market competitive with the
joint venture's product without informing the other party is not a collaterally restrictive
agreement).
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potential anticompetitive effects, however, is underscored by the fact
that joint ventures are often self-deterring.
31
D. APPROPRIATE Focus OF INQUIRY
The preceding discussion illustrates that joint ventures do not neces-
sarily harm or benefit competition because joint ventures can have di-
verse effects on competition. It follows, therefore, that courts should not
declare joint ventures per se illegal as they do many other potentially
anticompetitive activities.3 2 Because joint ventures offer procompetitive
effects and encompass a wide range of activities and circumstances,33 a
court should examine each joint venture individually before declaring
the transaction illegal.
34
In determining the legality of a particular joint venture, experts ad-
vocate the rule of reason analysis because it balances the procompeti-
tive effects and the anticompetitive effects. 5 In particular, courts and
31. See Wright, supra note 8, at 146 (enumerating reasons why parties would not
engage in a joint venture). For instance, potential joint venture participants must con-
sider the uncertainty of their contributions and benefits. S. BERG, J. DUNCAN & D.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 11. Further, joint ventures are difficult to organize and
involve agreement on several key points of strategy. Id. at 72.
32. Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 913. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding maximum fee price agreements of a medical society per
se unlawful); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 597 (1972)(finding alloca-
tion of territories to reduce retail competition illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 150 (1940) (declaring any price fixing agreement violative of
the Sherman Act).
Justice Black provided the logic behind the per se rule as follows:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the pre-
cise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of
per se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated
and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry in-
volved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a
particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless
when undertaken.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Courts classify activities
as per se illegal only if they can predict with confidence that the restraint would fail a
rule of reason test. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344 n.15.
33. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text (exploring procompetitive as-
pects of joint ventures).
34. See Kitch, supra note 7, at 957-59 (enumerating conditions of the joint venture
and its surrounding circumstances in determining a joint venture's impact on competi-
tion); Landes, supra note 3, at 635 (warning that the label of an activity does not
necessarily create a given impact on competition); Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 913 (de-
claring that the belief that a rule of reason analysis should be used for joint ventures is
virtually unanimous).
35. See Landes, supra note 3, at 635 (recommending that courts judge joint ven-
tures using a rule of reason test with particular emphasis on the effects on output);
[VOL. 6:435
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economists support the proposition that the effect on output is the key
factor in the analysis,3 6 although others have proposed a different fo-
cus.37 Despite their differences, however, all methods contain a common
thread: they possess, either inherently or overtly, what Weston and
Ornstein label the "renaissance in antitrust thinking."38 This renais-
sance focuses on efficiency as opposed to merely drawing inferences
from concentration ratios. 39 Accordingly, courts will determine a joint
venture's legality by examining its effects on competition, which may
include gains in efficiency as well as anticompetitive effects.
II. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
A. GOALS OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
United States antitrust law seeks to preserve competition, thereby
yielding efficient output at efficient prices.40 In Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 41 the Supreme Court declared that the Sherman Act
rests upon the theory that unrestrained competition yields the most effi-
cient allocation of resources, the highest quality products, and the
greatest material progress. 2 When one examines more specific goals,
Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 904 (urging courts to determine the legality of joint ventures
by the extent of integration and efficiencies derived from the joint venture as well as
whether the joint venture's restrictions are reasonably related to attaining thc efficien-
cies); Weston & Ornstein, supra note 17, at 94 (advising that United States antitrust
policy must allow United States companies to act without being restricted by "anti-
quated" and "doctrinaire" restrictions).
36. Landes, supra note 3, at 635. Landes states that "[a] practice harms competi-
tion when it restricts output and raises price, causing a deadweight or efficiency loss...
. [joint ventures] should be judged by a rule of reason analysis that focuses on the
effects on output." Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 4 (noting that output is an
important measuring tool).
37. Kitch, supra note 7, at 965. Kitch proposes an analysis for joint ventures pro-
viding that joint ventures are not likely to negatively affect competition if the partici-
pants have such a small market share that they are unable to influence competition, or
where the joint venture is in an area where the participants compete. Id. Further, he
contends that joint ventures are more likely to increase efficiency where they correct
externalities, gain economies of scale, or reap transactional efficiencies. Id.
Pitofsky uses a slightly different analysis. He views joint ventures as a tradoff be-
tween increased efficiency and anticompetitive effects. Pitofsky, supra note 8. at 904-
05. Hence, he would examine the extent of integration in the joint venture as a substi-
tute for increased efficiency which is difficult to measure. Id. To quantify the anticom-
petitive effects, Pitofsky would determine whether the joint venture's restrictions on the
participants are reasonably related to the procompetitive benefits sought. Id.
38. Weston & Ornstein, supra note 17, at 94.
39. Id.
40. Wright, supra note 8, at 148.
41. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
42. Id. at 4-5.
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however, distinct schools of thought emerge.43 One group believes that
antitrust law should serve a number of functions including distributing
income, limiting the concentration of economic power, and protecting
small businesses.44 The competing school of thought is that the sole
goal of antitrust law is efficiency, determined by total social welfare. 4"
This ongoing controversy renders the goals of antitrust law uncertain.40
The Supreme Court appears to favor the latter view, however, because
it most often emphasizes efficiency. 47 Consequently, the efficiency ap-
proach is most appropriate for analyzing joint ventures.
B. UNITED STATES JOINT VENTURE LAW-AN OVERVIEW
All three branches of the United States government have the ability
to affect the antitrust laws.48 The legislature enacted statutes forming
the basis for antitrust law,49 but has since played only a limited role in
43. See Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 917
(1987)(examining the raging battle between the economically oriented Chicago School
and the legislatively and judicially oriented New Coalition); Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-
Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming from? Where Are We Going?,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987)(finding three dominant groups challenging antitrust
law: the Chicago School, the left, and industrial policy proponents).
44. See Gerber, Foreward: Antitrust and the Challenge of Internationalization, 64
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 689, 692-94 (1988)(discussing the uncertainty of antitrust goals
yet listing deconcentration of economic power, protection of small businesses, and pro-
motion of consumer welfare as potential aims); Elzinga, supra note 3, at 1191
(1977)(listing and discussing efficiency, redistribution of income, and promotion of
small businesses as antitrust ideals); Lande, supra note 3, at 67 (hypothesizing that
Congress passed antitrust laws to achieve distributive equity or the prevention of "un-
fair" wealth transfers to producers); Pitofsky, The Political Context of Antitrust, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979)(urging courts to consider political values such as decon-
centration of economic power in addition to efficiency); Schwartz, supra note 3, at
1076-79 (declaring that the non-economic goal of justice should play a major role in
antitrust analysis). See also supra note 1 (discussing the debate over wealth transfer).
45. See R. BORK, supra note 3, at 81-89 (concluding that adherence to the single
goal of consumer welfare is preferable to a multiple goal approach). See also supra
note 3 (discussing that the wealth transfer is of no concern to those viewing efficiency
as the goal of antitrust law).
46. Gerber, supra note 44, at 694. The effect of this uncertainty regarding antitrust
goals has led to a "weakening of antitrust law rather than its careful modification in
response to the impact of internationalization." Id.
47. Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 913. See also id. at 907-13 (providing an overview of
Supreme Court cases regarding joint ventures).
48. See Gerber, supra note 44, at 702 (discussing the role each branch has
assumed).
49. E.g., Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2 (1982)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1984)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)). See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying
text (overviewing the four antitrust statutes particularly relevant to joint ventures).
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United States antitrust law.5 0 The courts, on the other hand, have
played a major role, shaping antitrust law through the interpretation of
the statutes in specific cases. 51 The executive branch, including admin-
istrative agencies, affects enforcement and composition of the courts
but plays an otherwise limited role.
5 2
Four statutes form the basis of United States antitrust law.5 3 They
are: section one of the Sherman Act, 4 section two of the Sherman
Act,55 section seven of the Clayton Act,56 and section five of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).5 These acts are individually
discussed below, but they all yield similar results for joint ventures. 8
Section one of the Sherman Act addresses joint activity. 9 The key
question in a section one analysis is whether the activity in question is a
restraint of trade.60 To answer this question, a court may place the
activity into one of two categories.6" The court may declare such per se
unlawful inherently restrictive agreements as price fixing or dividing
markets because they lack procompetitive benefits.62 Where there is the
50. Gerber, supra note 44, at 702. For example, the Sherman Act is extremely
broad, so that specific interpretation is left to the judiciary. Id.
51. Gerber, supra note 44, at 702.
52. See generally Baxter, Separation of Powers. Prosecutorial Discretion and the
"Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661. 673-82 (1982)(dis-
cussing separation of powers with respect to antitrust and concluding that the president
has authority to affect antitrust enforcement); Litvack, Government Antitrust Policy:
Theory Versus Practice and the Role of the Antitrust Division, 60 TEX. L. REV. 649,
650 (1982)(noting that the Reagan administration's focus on economic theory has af-
fected antitrust enforcement). See Wright, supra note 6, at 173-75 (exploring the De-
partment of Justice's enforcement policy regarding joint ventures).
53. This comment discusses only the central provisions of United States antitrust
statutes that relate to joint ventures.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
55. Id. § 2 (1982).
56. Id. § 18 (1982).
57. Id. § 45 (1982).
58. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 14, at 3 (specifying that the outcome of a joint
venture case depends more upon the specific facts than upon the applicable legal stan-
dard); Wright, supra note 8, at 149 (observing that the conclusion of whether a joint
venture is legal will be the same regardless of which statute the court applies); Brodley,
supra note 13, at 1539 (declining to consider the possibly varying reaches of the anti-
trust statutes because the remedies are equally available under all the statutes).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section one provides in relevant part that "every con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is de-
clared to be illegal." Id.
60. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1185.
61. Id.
62. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 595 (1972) (finding a hori-
zontal agreement geographically dividing markets per se unlawful); see also Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 150 (holding that price fixing in any form is per se
unlawful under section one of the Sherman Act). But see Broadcast Music v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 44 U.S. 1 (1979) (effectively overruling Topco by declaring that a
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potential for procompetitive benefits, however, the courts apply a rule
of reason test to weigh the restraint against the benefits it produces.
3
The first step in a rule of reason analysis is to evaluate market defini-
tion and market power." ' Definition of the relevant market contains two
components: the product market and the geographic market."5 The rel-
evant market must include suppliers of a similar product in a nearby
geographic area who, by their existence and ability to enter the rele-
vant market, restrain the antitrust defendant's power. 60 It is against
this background that a court examines the restraints and benefits of the
practice in question.17 Whether a court classifies the activity as per se
illegal or provides a rule of reason analysis, section one of the Sherman
Act is relevant to joint ventures because it addresses joint activity
directly.68
horizontal restraint was not per se unlawful). No R&D joint venture has been held per
se unlawful. Wright, supra note 8, at 152.
63. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (creating
the rule of reason analysis); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
175-80 (1911) (considering and further refining the rule of reason analysis). Some of
the factors courts may consider in determining the legality of the restraint under a rule
of reason analysis are: (1) whether the restraint regulates or suppresses competition;
(2) the nature of the industry involved; (3) the condition of the industry both before
and after the restraint; (4) the nature of the restraint and its probable or actual effect;
(5) the restraint's history; and (6) the intent of the parties imposing the restraint.
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 338-39 (1918)
Before the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act, courts analyzed R&D joint
ventures under the rule of reason standard. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1185. See Berkey
Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 302 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980) (concluding that the rule of reason is to be used with respect to joint
ventures); see also infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Berkey case).
64. Harris & Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 3, 4-6 (1984). Experts agree that "the purpose of defining a market is to
help measure a firm's power over price and output, or its power to foreclose markets."
Id. at 4. Because it is difficult to ascertain this power directly, courts will infer it from
the percentage of the market at issue in a given case. Id. Hence, a definition of the
relevant market to use as a benchmark is essential. Id. The focus of this Comment is
restricted to market definition and does not address market power. International joint
ventures alter the standard analysis for market definition, hence this Comment will
focus on market definition rather than market power. See Harris & Jorde, supra at 3
(discussing market power in the international context).
65. P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 512-13 (4th ed. 1988). Be-
cause this Comment challenges the common analysis of the geographic market, that is
where the focus shall be; see also id. at 575-77 (assessing product market determina-
tion); Wright, supra note 8, at 160-62 (discussing determination of the relevant prod-
uct market).
66. P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 65, at 572.
67. Id.
68. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1185. The seminal section one joint venture case, per-
haps even the seminal joint venture case, is Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263 (1980). See Wright, supra note 8, at 153 (characterizing Berkey as establish-
ing the standard for joint venture antitrust analysis). Berkey established the standard
for analyzing R&D joint ventures. Id. The court held that joint ventures are not per se
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Section two 9 of the Sherman Act is relevant to joint ventures be-
cause the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice
could accuse joint venture participants of monopolizing. As in a section
one analysis, the first step under section two is to determine the rele-
vant market .7 The next step is to determine whether the activity either
attempts to or succeeds in controlling prices or excluding competition.
7 1
The third statute, section seven of the Clayton Act, also threatens
the legality of a joint venture. This section forbids the acquisition of
stock or assets of another corporation if the result would be less compe-
tition or a potential monopoly.72 Although Congress intended section
seven to apply to the regulation of mergers,73 United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co. held section seven to govern joint ventures as well.'
Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the joint venture will decrease
competition in the relevant market."
illegal because they have procompetitive potential. Berkey, 603 F.2d at 302. joint ven-
tures also have the power to be exclusionary and accordingly are subject to antitrust
evaluation. Id. The heart of the analysis is whether the joint venture will increase or
decrease innovation which depends upon such factors as the market structure and the
research program. Wright, supra note 8, at 155-56.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section two states in relevant part that "[clvery person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or . . .conspire with another . . . to
monopolize any part of. . .trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony
70. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1187. The reason for this is that market power is the
measure courts use to determine whether an antitrust inquiry is warranted and, if so,
whether it constitutes monopoly power. P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, stpra note 65 at
337-40. In order to measure market power, one must first determine the relevant mar-
ket, both product and geographic. Id. § 241, at 572-75, see also supra note 65 (discuss-
ing market definition).
71. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). In
this case, the Court determined first that cellophane was the appropriate market and
then examined whether du Pont had monopoly power, that is, whether du Pont had the
"power to control prices or exclude competition." Id.
72. 14 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
73. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-13 (1962)(noting that
the original section seven forbade one corporation from acquiring the stock of another
if the acquisition would decrease competition between the two corporations or tend to
create a monopoly).
74. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1964). The
Court held that the effect of the restraint governs whether section seven controls the
restraint. Id. at 168. It continued by stating that a joint venture could reduce competi-
tion. Id. Further, the Court found that holding section seven inapplicable to joint ven-
tures created a loophole that Congress designed section seven to close. Id. Despite this
holding, the government has not yet successfully challenged an R&D joint venture
based upon section seven. Wright, supra note 8, at 153.
75. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 173-77. Under Penn-Olin, courts should consider the
following factors: the power of the actors in the relevant market and the nature of their
growth; the power of the joint venture's parents and the competition between them: the
nature of the joint venture and its purpose; the relationship of the joint venture's line of
commerce to its parents; the ease with which the joint venture could engage in an-
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Finally, section five of the FTC Act provides in pertinent part that
"unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful. '76 This section aims to prevent potential violations of anti-
trust law77 and therefore may cover activities not violating other sec-
tions. 78 There is no section five case on R&D joint ventures, so it is
difficult to predict how courts will address this issue. 9
C. THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH ACT
In 1984, the National Cooperative Research Act"0 (NCRA) codified
joint venture analysis. To avail themselves of the protections the
NCRA offers, those proposing an R&D joint venture may register with
the Attorney General as well as with the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)."' The NCRA applies to certain R&D joint ventures8 2 and con-
tains three main provisions.
ticompetitive practices; the potential power of the joint venture; what the effect would
be if the parents entered the joint venture's market on their own; and any other factors
that one might infer as a potential threat to competition in the relevant market. Id. at
177. In weighing these factors, the Court instructs consideration of congressional con-
cern with the potential lessening of competition rather than only tangible restraints. ld;
see also Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 897 (noting that the Supreme Court in Penn-Olin
expressed concern that joint ventures might reduce potential competition.)
76. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
77. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 692-93 (1948)(stating that
the legislative history of the FTC Act indicates intent to give the FTC and the courts
the power to stop restraints in their incipient stages).
78. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962) (assert-
ing that the Court may, under section five, stop restraints in their incipiency even
where such restraints do not violate other antitrust provisions); FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953)(finding that Congress passed the
FTC Act to supplement the Sherman and Clayton Acts by halting restrictive practices
which, if carried out, could violate the acts).
79. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1189.
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (1988).
81. See id. § 4305 (requiring joint venturers to file with the Attorney General or
the FTC in order to secure protection). Following the filing, the Attorney General or
the FTC will publish notice of the newly formed venture in the Federal Register. Id.
82. Id. § 4301(a)(6). The Act defines a joint research and development venture as:
[A]ny group of activities. . . by two or more persons for the purpose of-
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic study of phenomena or
observable facts,
(B) the development or testing of basic engineering techniques,
(C) the extension of investigative findings or theory of a scientific or technical
nature into practical application for practical and demonstration purposes, in-
cluding the experimental production and testing of models, prototypes, equip-
ment, materials, and processes,
(D) the collection, exchange, and analysis of research information, or
(E) any combination of the purposes specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C),
and (D), and may include the establishment and operation of facilities for the
conducting of research, the conducting of such venture on a protected and pro-
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First, the NCRA mandates a rule of reason standard for R&D joint
ventures. 83 It dictates that a court consider the activity's reasonable-
ness, accounting for all factors affecting competition in the relevant re-
search and development markets. 8
The other important provisions of the NCRA deal with recovery.
The successful challenger of a joint venture will not receive the usual
treble damages, but rather the challenger may only recover actual
damages against those R&D joint ventures registered with the FTC
and the Department of Justice.85 The NCRA also allows a court to
award attorney's fees in certain circumstances.8
prietary basis, and the prosecuting of applications for patents and the granting of
licenses for the results of such venture....
Id. Activities excluded from the definition and hence from the protection of the statute
include the exchange of information about costs, sales, and prices not related to the
venture, and restriction of marketing or production not related to the venture by one of
the participants. Id; see also Katsh, Act Sets New Standards for Research Ventures,
Wash. Legal Times, Nov. 26, 1984, at II (discussing issues raised by this definition).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1988). The NCRA specifically states that "a joint research
and development venture shall not be deemed illegal per se. ... Id.
84. Id. There are two main points of controversy regarding this provision. First,
there is debate concerning whether a traditional rule of reason analysis should be given
to qualifying R&D joint ventures or whether the more expansive "reasonableness"
standard is appropriate. Katsh, supra note 82, at 15. The traditional rule of reason
analysis only weighs the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects while the reasona-
bleness standard considers other factors such as innovation and national security. Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (stating that competition in relevant markets is only one of the
relevant considerations in the analysis); S. REP. No. 427, supra note 18, at 1-4 (sup-
porting consideration of other interests besides competition); H.R. REP. No. 1044, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMwIN. NEWS 3131,
3135-36 (stating that the effect on competition is the most important factor).
The second issue raised under section 4302 is the definition of the relevant market.
Many experts hold that the relevant geographic market for R&D joint ventures ought
to be international. See, e.g., Antitrust Policy and Competition 1983 Hearing Before
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1984) (state-
ment of Donald L. Martin, Vice President, Glassman-Oliver Economic Consultants,
Inc.) [hereinafter Antitrust Policy Hearings] (charging that the exclusion of foreign
producers in the analysis of relevant product and geographic markets is a matter of
great importance with respect to antitrust enforcement policy); Baldridge, Two Areas
of Antitrust Law in Need of Reform, 2 DEr. C. L. REV. 1035, 1041-43 (1983) (main-
taining that using domestic markets as the backdrop for the relevant market prevents
many mergers and acquisitions that could help U.S. competitiveness vis-a-vis foreign
firms in both domestic and international markets); Gerber, supra note 44, at 698-99
(detailing how the internationalization of markets makes defining the relevant market
difficult); Wright, supra note 8, at 162 (recommending that the relevant geographic
market for R&D joint ventures be international both because of efficient transportation
and the fact that there is significant foreign competition in R&D).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1988). This is not likely to have a significant impact on
R&D joint ventures because private causes of action are not a primary method of anti-
trust enforcement.
86. Id. § 4304.
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The key impetus for passing the NCRA was the growing concern
regarding the United States' position in the world market.87 Congress
proposed the NCRA in response to the United States' declining inter-
national technological competitiveness.88 As previously discussed, joint
ventures encourage the R&D so crucial to the United States' interna-
tional technological position. 89 The House and Senate, however, found
United States companies reluctant to participate in joint ventures for
one key reason: fear of antitrust litigation."0 Accordingly, the NCRA
87. See 130 CONG. REC. H10,565 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)(revealing that Repre-
sentatives Rodino, Edwards, Fish, Hyde, and Moorhead all emphasized the importance
of enhancing U.S. international competitiveness through the proposed NCRA). In par-
ticular, Representative Moorhead instructs that "the overriding purpose of [the
NCRA] is to encourage American companies to compete more effectively in the inter-
national marketplace. All of the provisions of this legislation should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with that overriding purpose and intent." Id. at H10,570.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 9 (1984)(reporting that U.S.
R&D expenditures decreased by 25% between 1964 and 1978). See also F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 407-08
(2d ed. 1980) (demonstrating that technological progress has affected U.S. economic
growth); Patent Law Improvements Act, 1984: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents. Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (evidencing lagging American technology).
See generally Antitrust Policy and Joint Research and Development Ventures, 1983:
Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm. of Congress, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. I
(1983) [hereinafter Joint Research and Development Venture Hearing] (stating that the
U.S. is losing its internationally dominant technological position).
89. See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text (exploring the relationship be-
tween joint ventures and R&D). Members of Congress argued that the encouragement
of joint ventures would alleviate other problems. S. REP. No. 427, supra note 16, at
3105. For instance, joint ventures would minimize the risks associated with R&D. Id.
In addition, the Senate found that United States firms were often duplicating research,
a wasteful cost that joint ventures would minimize. Id. at 3106. See generally The
National Productivity and Innovation Act and Related Legislation, 1983 and 1984:
Hearings on S. 1841, S. 568, S. 737 and S. 1383 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary
of the Senate, 98th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess. 1, passim (1983 and 1984) [hereinafter
National Productivity Hearings] (discussing how joint ventures decrease risk and re-
duce research duplication).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 656, supra note 88, at 10-11 (finding that despite the De-
partment of Justice's limited enforcement of joint venture antitrust violations and the
fact that there are few private actions, the business community perceives the threat of
antitrust litigation as an obstacle to forming a joint venture). See also S. REP. No.
427, supra note 18, at 3106 (stating that the business community fears antitrust prose-
cution). See generally National Productivity Hearings, supra note 89, passim (record-
ing several members of the business community expressing fear of antitrust litigation as
a barrier to entering joint ventures).
Another factor leading to the uncertainty of antitrust litigation perceived by the bus-
iness community is the lack of precedent with respect to joint ventures. Joint Research
and Development Hearing, supra note 88, at 25 (statement of William F. Baxter, As-
sistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice). But see National
Productivity Hearings, supra note 89, at 302 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox, Professor
of Law, New York University, School of Law)(testifying that she believes trade barri-
ers and lenient monopoly laws are the cause of the decline in technological progress).
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seeks to help United States firms compete internationally through
R&D joint ventures by clearly articulating when joint ventures will and
will not violate antitrust laws. 91
Another reason for enacting the NCRA is the behavior of other com-
petitors in the world market. Other nations, such as Japan, Germany,
and France, allow collaboration on R&D joint ventures,12 and govern-
ments even encourage collaborative behavior. 3 Behind the NCRA is a
sense that not all world competitors play by the same rules.94 Conse-
quently, the NCRA protects R&D joint ventures, the innovative col-
laborative efforts necessary to permit the United States compete in the
international marketplace.
III. SOUTH KOREAN ANTITRUST LAW 6
A. BACKGROUND: SOUTH KOREA'S LAW AND ECONOMY
South Korea's antitrust law differs significantly from that of the
United States. This divergence grows out of a different attitude toward
law in Korea. While Americans are litigious and confrontational, South
Koreans are not inclined to settle their disputes through litigation."
South Koreans have a general aversion toward legalism. 8 As a result,
91. 130 CONG. REC., supra note 87, at H10,567 (statement of Rep. Fish).
92. Id. at HI0,568 (statement of Rep. Hyde). The EC also allows substantial col-
laboration. Id. See National Productivity Hearings, supra note 89, at 12-13 (discussing
Japanese, French, and EC collaborative practices). For a detailed discussion of Japan's
government sponsored R&D programs, see Joint Research and Development Hearing,
supra note 88, at 198-234 (statement of Gary P. Saxonhouse, Professor of Economics,
University of Michigan).
93. S. REP. No. 427, supra note 18, at 3105.
94. 130 CONG. REC., supra note 87, at H10,566 (statement of Rep. Edwards).
95. S. REP. No. 427, supra note 18, at 3107.
96. There are two key reasons to compare South Korea with the United States: (I)
South Korea has experienced definitive growth over the last decade, and (2) South
Korea's antitrust laws are decidedly different, both in substance and enforcement, from
those of the United States. See Willis, Riding a Tiger: Joint Ventures under South
Korea's New Foreign Capital Inducement Act, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1023,
1023 (1985)(characterizing South Korea as one of the "four tigers of East Asia" that
is duplicating Japan's success); Gittelman, The South Korean Export Miracle: Com-
parative Advantage or Government Creation? Lessons for Latin America, 42 J. INT'L
AFF. 187, i87-88 (1988) (asserting that South Korea has achieved a spectacular
growth rate and that South Korea is one of Asia's brightest stars); Wagner, Antitrust.
The Korean Experience, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 471, 474 (1987) (reporting South Ko-
rea's impressive growth rates of 9.6% between 1963 and 1975 and 7.3% between 1975
and 1984).
97. SANG HYUN-SONG, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF Ko-
REA (1983).
98. Id. at 528. In what is regarded as the most important study of attitudes of
Koreans toward the law, only 32% of the Koreans surveyed indicated that they would
go to court to resolve a family problem. Haem Pyong-choon, The Attitudes of the
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litigation is relatively rare, and there is little South Korean caselawY9
Instead, South Koreans utilize reconciliation to settle the majority of
legal disputes. 100
In addition to understanding Korean attitudes regarding the law, one
must be familiar with the South Korean economy to comprehend its
antitrust laws. The most striking feature of the South Korean economy
is its extraordinary success in recent years. 1 1 A by-product of this
enormous success was the concentration of economic power in a few
producers." 2 This concentration of power, however, resulted partially
from government policies placing strength in those who are most exper-
ienced, and assuming that there are economies of scale to be reaped.1
0 3
Many criticized the South Korean government's policy of promoting
Korean People toward Law (1983) reprinted in SANG HYUN-SONG, supra note 97, at
57.
Part of the Korean aversion toward legalism can be traced to the long history of
Confucian influence on Korea. See id. at 43 (asserting that Confucianism is the most
persistent, persuasive, and influential teaching in East Asian history). Confucianism
teaches that nature's laws are necessarily superior to human or positive laws. Id.
Hence, Koreans are bred with the ideal that it is of tantamount importance to perfect
one's own human nature which makes the need and respect for positive laws minimal.
Id.
It is interesting to compare the relationship between law and religion in the Judeo-
Christian societies, such as the United States, with that in Korea. For instance, in the
Judeo-Christian heritage, God is frequently referred to as a judge and the laws and
commandments are central themes. Steinberg, Law and Development in Korean Soci-
ety, 13 KOREANA Q. 43 (1971), reprinted in SANG HYUN-SONG, supra note 97, at 49.
Further, judges play a significant role in Judeo-Christian history. Id. As a result, law in
western countries is validated by the countries' religious roots. Id. In contrast, Con-
fucianism does not suggest that human-made law is divinely inspired. In Korea, law is
a symbol of failed virtue, and justice is administered only because of the unfortunate
breakdown of harmony and peace. Id. at 50.
99. SANG HYUN-SONG, supra note 97, at 17. According to Sang Hyun-Song, "[ilt
is well-condified [sic] laws that are the primary statements of an integrated body of
general theory and it is thus Korean lawyers' job to interpret them more generally
.... Id. at 15. Korean statutes, however, are broad and loosely drawn so that ad-
ministrative regulations determine statutory interpretation. Id. at 253.
100. Id. at 17.
101. See Chan-Jin Kim, supra note 24, at 9 (reporting that between 1962 and
1980 the market share of the South Korean industrial sector doubled); SANG HYUN-
SONG, supra note 97, at (discussing South Korea's success).
102. Wagner, supra note 96, at 474. A few massive conglomerates belonging to
only a small number of people called chaebol controlled a large portion of the economy.
Id. Until 1979, however, South Korea's economic policy showed its belief that indus-
trial strength must be placed in the most experienced hands. Chan-Jin Kim, supra note
24, at 9. For example, the government assigned key economic industries to a limited
number of entrepreneurs who also received tax benefits and low interest loans. Id. In
1979, monopolists or oligopolists manufactured 89% of industrial goods in South Ko-
rea. Wagner, supra note 96, at 475.
103. Wagner, supra note 96, at 475.
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economic concentration, however, which prompted the government to
enact the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.'
B. THE MONOPOLY REGULATION AND FAIR TRADE ACT
Although the legislative history of the Monopoly Regulation and
Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) is not well documented, 0 the general view
is that the South Korean government designed it to control monopolies,
oligopolies, and anticompetitive abuses by companies with large market
shares. 106 The South Korean government hopes to achieve these goals
by prohibiting abuse of market dominating positions, 10 7 restricting the
combination of enterprises and controlling market concentration,' 0 8 re-
stricting unreasonable joint acts, 09 designating unfair trade acts,"10
and restricting resale price maintenance."'
MRFTA chapters nine through fourteen govern its administration
and enforcement." 2 The MRFTA vests primary enforcement authority
in the Economic Planning Board (EPB), an economic ministry headed
by the deputy prime minister.113 The EPB supervises all ministries gov-
104. Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree 12120, Apr. 1, 1987.
105. See Wagner, supra note 96, at 473 (stating that debates, which must have
occurred, over the MRFTA are captive in the memories of South Korean economic
ministries); Haley, Antitrust Enforcement in Korea. E. ASIA, EXEc. REPS.. Oct. 1985,
at 8 (noting that there have been few writings in any language regarding the impetus
for enacting the MRFTA).
106. See, e.g.. Lee Hwa Ja, Antitrust and Fair Trade Law Goes into Effect, E.
AsIAN EXEC. REPS., May 1981, at 25 (observing that the MRFTA was formed to en-
courage free competition by restricting monopolies and anticompetitive practices of
large businesses); Sang Hyun-Song, New Antimonopoly Law Proposed, E. AsIAN
EXEC. REPS., Nov. 1980, at 3 (noting that the law is intended to suppress monopolies.
oligopolies, and anticompetitive practices).
Article one of the MRFTA states the Act's purpose as follows: "The purpose of this
Decree is to prescribe matters delegated by, and matters necessary for the enforcement
of, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act." MRFTA, art. I. The stated purpose
of the July 21, 1984 version of the MRFTA is different from the 1987 amendment:
This Act, by prohibiting abuse of market dominating position by entrepreneurs
and excessive concentration of economic power, and by controlling unreasonable
concerted activities and unfair trade practices, aims to encourage fair and free
competition and thereby to stimulate creative business activities and to protect
consumers as well as promote a balanced development of the national economy.
MRFTA, art. 1 (as amended July 21, 1984), reprinted in Wagner, supra note 94, at
477-78.
107. MRFTA arts. 3 to 11.
108. Id. arts. 12 to 16; see also Chan-Jin Kim, supra note 24, at 28-34 (discussing
the restrictions on the combination of enterprises under the MRFTA in detail).
109. MRFTA arts. 17 to 20-2.
110. Id. arts. 21 to 21-2.
111. Id. arts. 24 to 26.
112. Id. Ch. 9-14.
113. Id. arts. 5, 6, 10.
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erning South Korea's economic affairs." 4 The EPB may also pursue
corrective action, promulgate regulations, and investigate potential vio-
lations of the MRFTA.
115
The MRFTA also establishes two enforcement agencies within the
EPB; the Fair Trade Office (FTO) and the Fair Trade Commission
(the Commission)." 6 The assistant minister for fair trade heads the
FTO, which performs investigative and enforcement functions such as
conducting investigations, developing policy, and drafting rules. 117 The
Commission, a five member regulatory body, considers such issues as
corrective measures before referring them to the EPB for final
action." 8
The MRFTA mandates that participants in joint acts apply for au-
thorization.11 9 The minister of the EPB reviews the proposed joint ac-
tivity. 20 The minister then oversees the registration process and either
authorizes, demands, or rejects the activity.' 2 '
The MRFTA provides five justifications upon which the minister
may authorize joint acts.' 2' First, the minister may authorize the joint
act based upon industrial efficiency or "rationalization."" 3 This re-
quires that: (1) the joint act obviously enhance efficiency; (2) the effi-
ciency be difficult to achieve by any other method; and (3) the effi-
ciency be greater than the effects of prohibiting a restriction on
competition."
4
Second, the minister may authorize a joint act under the MRFTA in
order to overcome an economic depression if four conditions are satis-
fied." 5 The MRFTA requires: (1) a continually decreasing demand for
a certain good leading to a lasting glut; (2) a market price for the good
114. Government Organization Act of Korea, art. 28, reprinted in, Wagner, supra
note 96, at 484.
115. MRFTA arts. 5, 6, 10, 16, 25, ch. 9.
116. Id. arts. 5, 6, 10.
117. Wagner, supra note 96, at 482-85.
118. Id. at 486. It is important to note that both the FTO and the Commission are
subordinate to the EPB. Id. at 484. The EPB has the power to enforce; the FTO is only
responsible for enforcement activities and the Commission's power is merely advisory.
Id.
119. See Wagner, supra note 96, at 477 (observing that agencies achieve enforce-
ment by requiring registration).
120. MRFTA art. 17.
121. Id.
122. Id. arts. 19 to 19-5. Note that four of the five justifications were inserted into
the act by the 1987 amendment. Id. arts. 19-2 to 19-5.
123. Id. art. 19.
124. Id.; see also supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussing the effi-
ciency gains of joint ventures and the anticompetitive risks associated with joint
ventures).
125. MRFTA art. 19-2.
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below average cost of production for a considerable period; (3) concern
that enterprises will have difficulty maintaining their businesses; and
(4) a showing that it is impossible to rectify the problems listed in (1)
and (3) by rationalizing the enterprise.
126
Third, the minister may permit a joint act in order to adjust indus-
trial structure. 2 7 This authorization is only appropriate where: (1)
there is excess supply in an industry due to a change in domestic and
foreign economic situations or where production facilities cause inter-
national competitiveness to decrease; (2) it is not possible to rectify the
problem of excess supply by rationalizing the enterprise; and (3) the
effect of adjusting the industrial structure will be more beneficial than
the effect of prohibiting the restriction on competition.12 8
Fourth, the minister may authorize a joint act to improve the com-
petitive power of small and medium enterprises.1 29 To authorize such a
joint act: (1) it must be obvious that the activity will increase produc-
tivity or increase the negotiating power of the participating businesses
regarding terms and conditions of doing business; (2) all participants
must be small and medium-sized enterprises; and (3) it must be diffi-
cult for smaller businesses to compete with large enterprises by any
other means than the joint activity.1 30
Finally, the minister may authorize joint activity to rationalize the
terms and conditions of business.13' The requirements are: (1) rational-
ization would obviously enhance productive efficiency; (2) rationaliza-
tion of the terms and conditions of business are both technically and
economically practicable for most businesses in the field; and (3) the
effect of rationalization is more beneficial than the effect of prohibiting
a restriction on competition.
32
Only one provision imposes limits on which joint acts the minister
may authorize. 33 This provision dictates that the minister cannot au-
thorize a joint act if: (1) participants structure the joint act more
broadly than it needs to be in order to achieve its goal; (2) the joint act
has potential to unreasonably damage interests of consumers and other
firms in the industry; (3) the joint act contains unjust discrimination
126. Id.
127. Id. art. 19-3.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 19-4.
130. Id.
131. Id. art. 19-5.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 19-6. This provision addresses the use of collateral restraints: see also
supra note 26 (discussing collateral restraints in greater detail).
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among participants; or (4) participants are unlawfully restricted from
participating in or withdrawing from the joint act.""
Despite the attention the MRFTA gives to joint acts and other po-
tentially anticompetitive behavior cases indicate that courts use the
MRFTA to ensure fairness and prevent deceptive retail practices more
often than to preserve competition. 3 5 Essentially, the MRFTA is a tool
used for consumer protection and, 136 in fact, most MRFTA cases in-
volve false and misleading advertising.
37
IV. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND
JOINT VENTURES
The internationalization of markets is a complicated and mul-
tifaceted process. Foreign production, more and more, is meeting the
demands of United States consumers."8 A corollary to this is that pro-
ducers seek to sell their goods in more than one state or country. 39
Hence, competition comes from all over the world, and competition in
technology-oriented fields is especially fierce. 4 As a result, the busi-
ness community in these technological sectors makes business decisions
in order to maintain their international technological competitive-
ness. "' The best way to achieve this goal according to the business
community is through R&D joint ventures.1
4 2
134. MRFTA art. 19-6. This provision was added by the 1987 amendment. Id.
135. Haley, supra note 105, at 8. Between April 1981 and July 1985, the break-
down of MRFTA cases was as follows: two relating to competition-restricting stock
acquisition, three concerning abuse of a market-dominating position, eight regarding
collusive activities, 26 considering competition-restricting activities of trade associa-
tions, and 236 cases of unfair trade practices such as false advertising and tie-ins.
Wagner, supra note 96, at 505. See Haley, supra note 105, at 26-27 (discussing unfair
trade practice cases in detail).
136. Wagner, supra note 96, at 505. South Korean case reports are not indicative
of the full picture, however, because they contain only those cases where the EPB
found violations and issued corrective orders. Id. Hence, there is not information on
what complaints had been considered and rejected. Id.
137. Id. at 516. The Korean government has not been afraid to scrutinize some of
its largest companies' advertising; it has found violations by Hyundai, Samsung, and
Dae Woo Motor Company. Id. Some advertising violations under the MRFTA have
included misleading statements regarding a competitor's product, misleading endorse-
ments, and false labeling. Haley, supra note 105, at 26-27.
138. Gerber, supra note 44, at 690.
139. Id.; see also, Pagoulatos & Sorensen, Industrial Policy and Firm Behavior in
an International Context, in WESTERN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 305 (1980).
140. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1181.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1181-82.
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A. THE UNITED STATES
The internationalization of markets has had an unsettling effect on
United States antitrust law. 1 3 United States firms suffering from stiff
foreign competition blame the antitrust joint venture laws because of
the uncertainty these laws create.14' As a result, Congress, realizing the
United States' decline and the importance of joint ventures to enhance
its position, enacted the National Cooperative Research Act
(NCRA).145
The United States' international competitiveness in high technology
sectors has been on the decline for over a decade. 14  The competitive
decline corresponded with reduced total spending on R&D. 147 This is
not surprising, however, because international competitiveness corre-
lates positively with R&D spending. 148 Advocates of the NCRA main-
tained that the declining world market position of the United States
resulted from insufficient spending on R&D which, in turn, was caused
by the fear of United States companies to enter R&D joint ventures
because they might violate the antitrust laws.
1 49
The NCRA responded to this fear by codifying existing law. joint
ventures receive a rule of reason analysis where the procompetitive ben-
143. See Blechman, Use of Joint Ventures to Foster U.S. Competitiveness in Inter-
national Markets, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 65 (1984)(noting the perception that US. inter-
national competitiveness is lacking due, in part, to U.S. antitrust laws with particular
concern for joint ventures).
144. E.g., Baldridge, supra note 84, at 1035 (voicing the Department of Com-
merce's concern that U.S. companies refrain from R&D joint ventures due to fear of
violating antitrust laws); Kuhn, supra note 14, at 1182-83 (reporting that potential
lawsuits and treble damages have hindered the use of R&D joint ventures by business-
people); supra note 90 and accompanying text (evidencing the fear of antitrust viola-
tion by the business community and exploring the source of the uncertainty).
145. See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative history
of the NCRA).
146. Wright, supra note 8, at 138-39. The decline in technological competitiveness
began before the 1980 appreciation of the dollar which suggests a lack of strength in
the United States technology sector. Id.
147. L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOLUTION 148 (1985)(reporting that American
firms cut research in half during 1980-81 and 1982-83 in the face of increasing inter-
national competition).
148. Wright, supra note 8, at 139. In other words, firms that spend a large portion
of revenues on R&D tend to be more internationally competitive than those firms that
do not commit substantial resources to R&D. Id.
149. Id. In addition, proponents of the NCRA voiced concern that the antitrust
laws of U.S. trading partners are looser than those of the United States. See 130
CONG. REC. S8963 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (articulat-
ing his concern that Japan allows its companies to conduct R&D joint ventures); 130
CONG. REc., supra note 87, at H10,568 (statement of Rep. Hyde) (stating that the
United States' trading partners permit collaboration on R&D joint ventures). See also
supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing that other countries permit collabora-
tion on R&D).
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efits are weighed against the anticompetitive effects. 150 The NCRA,
will not, however, aid the United States in international markets if
courts determine benefits and costs in relation to the domestic mar-
ket. 5' If courts consider international markets the benchmark for
R&D, as many experts suggest they must,' 52 then the NCRA will per-
mit the large scale R&D joint ventures necessary to compete on the
world market. 53
Perhaps the goal of United States antitrust law, however, is not to
preserve a niche in the world market for American firms. As discussed
previously, the goals of United States antitrust law are nebulous.5 4
Congress erected the pillars of antitrust law, the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act, upon an ideal of domestic competitiveness. 5 5 Congress,
however, enacted the NCRA, the most recent antitrust statute, to save
domestic competition not by ensuring the rigors of the United States
marketplace, but rather by attempting to prevent foreign firms from
driving domestic companies out of the market entirely.'56 The result is
that policy-makers must make a crucial choice: whether to continue the
United States antitrust tradition of domestic market competitiveness
above all else or whether to confront the reality of foreign conglomer-
ates crushing the American firms that conform to the traditional
United States antitrust ideal. The solution to this problem is considered
below.
150. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
151. See id. (providing expert opinions recommending the use of international mar-
kets as a benchmark). This is important because a company may possess monopoly
power domestically but not internationally.
152. See id. (discussing experts' views suggesting that the relevant geographic mar-
ket should be international).
153. See Gerber, supra note 44, at 691 (asserting that the primary characteristic
necessary for international competition is large size). Antitrust critics contend that
"bigness" promotes efficiency and economies of scale. Adams & Brock, The "New
Learning" and the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1515, 1519 (1986). In
addition, many assert that large business entities are able to eliminate transaction
costs. Id. Some experts, however, do not regard "bigness" a sign of strength. Id. at
1546-66.
154. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing the diverse goals of
United States antitrust law).
155. See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 65, at 50-60 (discussing the legisla-
tive history of United States antitrust laws). Considering the history of United States
antitrust laws it is clear that Congress enacted the first antitrust statutes before the
United States was exposed to rigorous international competition. Id.
156. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative history
of the NCRA with particular attention to international competitiveness).
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B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES AND SOUTH
KOREAN JOINT VENTURE STATUTES
South Korea's joint venture statute takes a different approach than
does that of the United States. Two of South Korea's five justifications
for joint activity directly address problems plaguing the United States.
First, in a joint act to adjust industrial structure, South Korea's Eco-
nomic Planning Board must consider international competitiveness in
its skeletal rule of reason analysis. 157 The NCRA, in contrast,
prescribes a vague rule of reason test in relation to "properly defined
relevant research and development markets . . taking into account all
relevant factors." 158 Although the NCRA's legislative history reveals
that Congress enacted it to promote international competitiveness, the
NCRA does not mention international status as a relevant factor to be
considered. Second, South Korea explicitly provides the opportunity for
joint activity to enhance the power of small and medium-sized firms,
provided that they do so by narrowly-tailored means.1 9 The United
States statute provides no such opportunity.
C. THE APPROPRIATE GOAL OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW1 60
Many antitrust experts propose that consumer welfare alone should
be the goal of United States antitrust law.161 Another goal, however,
157. MRFTA art. 19-3. This focus on international competitiveness is mirrored in
the MRFTA antimerger provisions. Chan-Jin Kim, supra note 24, at 30-31. There, as
in the provisions relating to joint activity, the details of what to consider in determining
what is required for the exception are left out of the regulations, leaving the adminis-
trative authority latitude in applying the exceptions. Id.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1988).
159. MRFTA art. 19-4.
160. Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm an-
swer to one question: What is the point of the law-what are its goals? Everything else
follows from the answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be guided by one value or by
several? If by several, how is he to decide cases where a conflict in values arises? Only
when the issues of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of
substantive rules. R. BORK, supra note 3, at 50.
161. Id. at 81. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (explaining the differ-
ent goals experts have advocated for antitrust law). There are three reasons to adopt
this position. First, it reduces uncertainty for those businesses who must conform to
antitrust laws. R. BORK, supra note 3, at 81. In contrast to a multiple goal system
where one never knows which judge will find which goal determinative, the consumer
welfare goal gives the business community fair notice of what standard will be applied.
Id.
Second, a consumer welfare goal ensures that the legislature as well as the judiciary
perform their proper roles. More specifically, when courts decide upon the operating
goals of antitrust, such as protecting small business or income distribution, they are
making sweeping policy choices. Id. at 82-83. It is inappropriate for courts to be mak-
ing these decisions without specific congressional guidance. In a democracy, the repre-
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may be the maintenance of United States international competitive-
ness. The notion of considering the United States' world market posi-
tion in formulating its antitrust laws is manifest in the legislative his-
tory of the NCRA.6 2 Although this consideration is not written in the
statute, many experts argue that international competitiveness is a cur-
rent goal of United States antitrust law.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The NCRA is unlikely to effectively enhance United States interna-
tional competitiveness for several reasons.16 3 The NCRA is merely a
codification of existing law; it does not declare R&D joint ventures le-
gal, and it does not give them antitrust immunity. 64 Further, although
damages resulting from private causes of action are now actual instead
of treble, private parties are still free to sue and the actual damages
can be great.16 5 Finally, the NCRA's rule of reason analysis does little
to provide the business community with their desired certainty because
sentative body of the legislature is to make basic policy decisions; the courts' duty is to
carry them out. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (declaring all legislative powers to be
vested in Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2 (vesting judicial power in the Su-
preme Court which extends to all cases arising under the Constitution, United States
laws, and treaties). Additionally, the legislature has access to the resources necessary
for the type of massive fact-finding needed to make this important policy decision. R.
BORK, supra note 3, at 82. Several groups argue, however, that the legislative history
of the antitrust statutes is sufficient to steer the courts. There is evidence in the legisla-
tive history to suggest a consumer welfare goal. See R. BORK, supra note 3, at 50-71
(finding the history of the Sherman Act to have considered consumer welfare as a
goal). See also Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7 (1966) (providing a detailed argument that the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act suggests a consumer welfare goal). Further, there is nothing in the antitrust
statutes to suggest that consumer welfare is subordinate to any other objective. R.
BORK, supra note 3, at 82.
Finally, pursuing a consumer welfare goal will avoid arbitrary distinctions and an-
ticonsumer rules. Id. Maximizing total consumer surplus is the only way to avoid sub-
jective value judgments regarding whether producers or consumers get the surplus. Id.
In other words, the consumer welfare goal will make the pie as large as possible with-
out allowing courts to decide how to slice it and who gets the biggest piece.
162. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative history
of the NCRA).
163. Wright, supra note 8, at 175. See Blechman, supra note 143, at 67 (comment-
ing that concerns addressed by the proposed NCRA, per se illegality and treble dam-
ages, are not what is keeping U.S. industries from being internationally competitive).
Between 1984 and June, 1988, only Ill cooperative joint ventures had registered under
the NCRA. T. JORDE & D. TEECE, INNOVATION, COOPERATION & ANTITRUST 100
(Oct. 7, 1988) (revised discussion draft) (on file with The American University Journal
of International Law and Policy).
164. Wright, supra note 6, at 176. See T. JORDE & D. TEECE, supra note 163, at
99 (observing that registered firms are still subject to antitrust litigation).
165. Further, costs incurred in defense of an antitrust suit can be substantial. T.
JORDE & D. TEECE, supra note 163, at 99.
[VOL. 6:435
US JOINT VENTURE LAWS
such an analysis involves a weighing of the specific circumstances.166
Hence, court decisions are extremely fact specific and therefore of little
predictive value to businesses.
1 67
Although it is not likely that the United States will alter its antitrust
laws so radically as to abolish them"6 8 or to impose them upon other
countries, 69 the United States could benefit by following certain ele-
ments of South Korea's model. For instance, the structure of South
166. Wright, supra note 8, at 178. See Legislative Proposals to Modify the US.
Antitrust Laws to Facilitate Cooperative Arrangements to Commercialize Innovation:
Hearing on H.R. 1024, H.R. 1025 & H.R. 2264 Before the Subcomm. on Economics
& Commercial Law of the House Judiciar' Comm., 101st Cong.. 1st Sess. 24
(1989)[hereinafter Proposal Hearing] (statement of Thomas M. Jorde, Professor of
Law, University of California (Boalt Hall) at Berkley) (finding that a registration sys-
tem will not yield the certainty required to encourage large scale joint ventures); T.
JORDE & D. TEECE, supra note 163, at 98-99 (noting that the NCRA provides little, if
any, guidance for its mandated rule of reason analysis).
167. See Proposal Hearing (statement of Thomas M. Jorde), supra note 166. at 24
(explaining that a registration system will lead to case-by-case determinations which
will prove expensive and unpredictable).
For an example of how the NCRA fails to encourage sufficient R&D joint ventures,
see Abbott, U.S. Competitiveness Would be Enhanced by Amending the 1984 Act,
Legal Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at 24.
168. See Kuhn, supra note 14, at 696-97 (suggesting that internationalization obvi-
ates, or at least reduces, the need for antitrust law). United States antitrust laws have
been called futile and obsolete. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SocETY; DISTRIBUTION
AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 146 (1980). The reason for this is that
United States antitrust laws have a national focus that does not fit today's international
world. Id. Another expert asserts that "[a] purely national view of antitrust law has
long since ceased to correspond to the reality of world economics, and hardly continues
to correspond to legal reality." Fikentscher, Third World Trade Partnership: Suprana-
tional Authority vs. National Extraterritorial Antitrust-A Plea for "Harmonized"
Regionalism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (1984). For example, many of the industri-
alized countries of the West rely upon exports for a large portion of their national
income. Id. This may indeed be the case because international competition creates the
competitiveness that the antitrust laws seek to foster. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 697. See
Grossman, Import Competition from Developed and Developing Countries, 64 REv.
EcON. & STATIsTIcS 271, 271-72 (1982)(reporting results of a study which evidences
the increased competition from United States trading partners). International competi-
tiveness reduces the ability to acquire the market power necessary for many antitrust
violations. Kuhn, supra note 14, at 697. However, to say that internationalization elim-
inates the need for all antitrust law in all contexts may not be correct. Id. More appro-
priately, to account for the increased internationalization of the market, joint ventures
should be analyzed with respect to how they affect the goals and functions of antitrust
law. Id. In particular, because this internationalization has directly and seriously af-
fected United States technology and R&D, courts and legislators should pay specific
attention to internationalization as it affects joint venture laws if United States technol-
ogy is to remain internationally competitive. Id.; see also Antitrust Policy Hearing,
supra note 84, at 63-69 (arguing that antitrust law as it exists in the United States
should be abolished).
169. See Chan-Jin Kim, supra note 24, at 38 (commenting that, with respect to a
joint venture, application of United States antitrust law could contravene the laws of
another country if, for instance, host governments encourage monopolizing).
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Korea's joint venture laws is more conducive to the formation of joint
ventures than is that of the United States. South Korean joint ventures
register with the minister who, if the venture qualifies, approves the
joint venture and declares it legal. 170 United States joint ventures, on
the other hand, register with the FTC or the Department of Justice
who declare that if there is an antitrust action, the joint venture's lia-
bility is limited to actual damages. 171 The joint venture is not declared
legal; it is merely not yet deemed illegal so that the United States joint
venture is still subject to a costly and potentially crippling lawsuit at
any time. Although one of the stated goals of the NCRA was to pro-
vide antitrust certainty to United States joint ventures, lawmakers
would have remained more faithful to their goal by following South
Korea's model.1
71
A further revision that would improve the United States antitrust
laws governing joint ventures is eliminating the vague rule of reason
analysis sketched in the NCRA. Congress should articulate clearly
drawn factors for courts to consider, such as international competitive-
ness. 73 This guidance would allow joint ventures to act with increased
certainty.
CONCLUSION
The crux of the United States antitrust crisis is policy-makers' in-
ability to face the reality of the United States' economic decline and
how misguided antitrust policies have contributed to it. Instead of con-
tinuing in the tradition of pursuing domestic competitiveness, United
States lawmakers must not ignore the fact that the world has changed.
National economic boundaries have become blurred.
United States lawmakers must take antitrust action similar to that
taken in South Korea to ensure international competitiveness. Although
170. See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text (discussing the minister's
oversight authority).
171. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
172. See H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (providing for a similar certifi-
cation approach in the proposed National Cooperative Innovation and Commercializa-
tion Act of 1989). In support of the bill, Congressman Boucher stated that "[w]hat the
U.S. needs is assurance before the joint venture is undertaken that it will not violate
the antitrust laws." 135 CONG. REC. E425-26 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Boucher). He explained that the bill provides for approval of joint ventures so
that, once certified, they would be free of any potential civil liability. Id. If such a
certification method were employed, more firms would be encouraged to undertake
joint ventures because it would banish the risk of unforeseen antitrust exposure. T.
JORDE & D. TEECE, supra note 163, at 100.
173. See Wright, supra note 8, at 186 (recommending that United States antitrust
doctrine explicitly factor international competitiveness into its antitrust equation).
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international competitiveness has not always been a goal of United
States antitrust law in the past, it is a growing concern, as the NCRA's
legislative history evidences. Moreover, if the United States is to have
rigorous domestic competitiveness, it must have firms that are able to
compete. If United States antitrust laws continue to ignore interna-
tional competitiveness as a goal, there may not be any United States
firms left to compete.
